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Social sharing capacities have attracted attention from a number of fields of social 
cognition and have been variously defined and analyzed in numerous studies. Social 
sharing consists in the subjective awareness that aspects of the self’s experience 
are held in common with other individuals. The definition of social sharing must take 
a variety of elements into consideration: the motivational element, the contents of the 
social sharing experience, the emotional responses it evokes, the behavioral outcomes, 
and finally, the circumstances and the skills which enable social sharing. The primary 
objective of this study is to explore some of the diverse forms of human social sharing 
and to classify them according to levels of complexity. We identify four different types 
of social sharing, categorized according to the nature of the content being shared and 
the complexity of the mindreading skills required. The second objective of this study 
is to consider possible applications of this graded model of social sharing experience 
in clinical settings. Specifically, this model may support the development of graded, 
focused clinical interventions for patients with personality disorders characterized by 
severe social withdrawal.
Keywords: social sharing, reciprocity, intimacy, avoidant personality disorder, mindreading, metacognition, social 
withdrawal
introdUCtion
A fundamental characteristic of human sociality is that humans appear to have a specific aptitude for 
social sharing, cooperation, and reciprocity. Human social sharing skills have attracted interest from 
a wide range of disciplines: from philosophy, the social sciences and anthropology to psychology 
and, more recently, the neurosciences. Depending upon the field of research involved, the concept 
of social sharing has assumed very different connotations, and it has been studied from various 
perspectives and using diverse methodologies.
In order to arrive at a comprehensive definition of the social sharing concept, keeping in mind 
these diverse areas of research, we must take into account the various constituent elements of this 
kind of social interaction: the motivational element, or the impulse which induces human beings 
in early ontogeny to engage in it; the contents of social sharing, or the variety of mental states 
that human beings share with each other in social interactions; the subjective experience and the 
emotional responses it evokes; the behavioral outcomes of social sharing; and, finally, the mental 
functions or cognitive components which underpin this specific form of social interaction.
With regard to motivational aspects, most researchers agree that social sharing is a primary 
objective in itself (and not secondary to other interpersonal objectives), that it is innate and that 
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it emerges at a very early stage of development. In early infancy, 
human beings already appear to possess an intrinsic motivation 
to initiate social exchanges and to engage in reciprocal interac-
tions (1–3). Studies of infants have shown that 2-month-old 
infants display various emotional reactions to attention directed 
toward the self as well as to intra- and interpersonal coordination 
during face-to-face communication (4, 5). At an early age, young 
children also appear predisposed to share interests and goals with 
others (6, 7). Joint attention is considered a very early signal of 
the human predisposition for social sharing. At 9–12  months, 
infants are already able to coordinate their visual attention with 
others and are able to produce a triadic gesture involving not 
only the child and an adult but additionally an external event or 
entity. Specifically, in proto-declarative pointing, the infant uses 
pointing to an object as a tool for capturing adult attention and 
for sharing with the adult their own interest in an object or event 
(8, 9). Fourteen- to eighteen-month-old human infants do under-
stand shared intentions and they respond accordingly (7, 10, 11). 
During their second year of life, infants extend their repertoire of 
social sharing behaviors: they engage in pro-social and coopera-
tive behaviors. Toddlers help others in many ways, comforting 
those in distress or providing instrumental help. For example, 
they can help adults by pointing to provide needed information 
or by fetching out of reach objects (12–16). At the same age, their 
sharing behaviors also increase: toddlers offer toys to the adults 
and they point with the purpose of sharing interest with others 
(17). 18-month-old children demonstrate that they are able to 
collaborate with adults in joint activities, having a joint goal in 
mind. The children, for example, actively attempted to reengage 
the adult communicatively if adult unexpectedly interrupted the 
joint action and they participated enthusiastically in these social 
games, in which there was no material reward (12). By 3 years 
of age, there is evidence that children are beginning also to feel 
some of the commitments and obligation inherent in joint action 
themselves, as when they excuse themselves when they have to 
leave a joint action (18).
The enormous development of social media in recent years 
could be viewed as a further indirect manifestation of this innate 
and spontaneous human motivation to engage in social sharing. 
Users can now communicate their experiences with potentially 
unlimited numbers of people. In 2016, there were 2.34 billion 
social network users worldwide [see Ref. (19)].
Although social sharing is considered an innate and universal 
human need (16), in some clinical conditions, the absence of this 
desire predominates. This is the case with Schizoid Personality 
Disorder (20, 21) and also in the autistic spectrum disorders. 
Recent interpretations of the social difficulties of patients with 
high functioning autism suggest that their main difficulty is not 
primarily an impaired understanding of other people’s mental 
states, but rather an absence of motivation to engage in social 
sharing. In consequence, they are less sensitive to and less aware 
of the interpersonal information which is relevant for social 
bonding (22, 23).
Human social sharing can also be defined in terms of the 
mental state, the content, which is shared between the agents. 
Engaging in joint actions in order to achieve a common objective 
can be considered an example of social sharing. Even in such 
simple situations, for joint action to take place, the two agents 
must share the same intention and the same goal. Collective 
intentionality has been defined as the ability that allows human 
beings to develop joint intentions and joint commitments in 
cooperative actions (16). In one frequently cited example given 
by Gilbert (24), human joint intention is explained through the 
comparative analysis of two superficially similar actions. The first 
is a simple cooperative act, illustrated by the idea of going for 
a walk with a friend. The second is a random act, which to an 
external observer could appear indistinguishable from the first: 
two strangers are walking down a road side by side. The difference 
between these two similar actions becomes immediately apparent 
when we imagine what would ensue if one agent should suddenly 
walk off in another direction. If the two agents were not out walk-
ing together, this sudden deviation would have no relevance and 
would provoke no consequences. However, if the person veering 
off were engaged in a joint action, based on a pre-existing joint 
intention, this move would affect the behavior of the other and 
would most probably provoke surprise or protest at the violation 
of a joint plan of action (24, 25). Recent neuropsychological 
studies have produced substantial data on the neural mechanisms 
involved in dyadic, interactive, and mutual actions (26–32).
However, as Schweikard and Schmid (33) have emphasized, 
collective intentionality comes in a variety of different modes, 
which include shared intention, joint attention, shared belief, and 
collective emotion. For example, the precocious human capac-
ity for joint attention can be seen as the foundation for another 
social sharing content: mutual knowledge or common ground 
(34). Common ground can be defined as the body of past shared 
experience held in common by the agents in a communicative 
interaction. This constitutes a shared frame of reference, an 
implicit and extended context that defines the ultimate mean-
ing of the interaction. Common ground is therefore a crucial 
component of human communication, and it is considered a 
core feature of social relationships (16, 35). Child development 
studies have shown that once children have acquired the capacity 
for joint attention, at between 1 and 2 years of age, they begin 
to accumulate shared knowledge derived from their interactions 
with others and to make use of this shared knowledge in ways that 
are specific to the persons they are relating to Ref. (36).
Social sharing can also involve the emotional domain; in fact, 
many researchers use the term social sharing to refer exclusively 
to the social sharing of emotion (37). Affect sharing can involve 
implicit processes, as in the affective attunement during early 
mother–infant interactions (38), but it can also refer to the con-
scious sharing of emotional states, such as when we realize that we 
share the same enthusiasm for a work of art with another person 
or the same disappointment when our football team loses the 
game. Sharing of emotion requires high levels of sensitivity and 
responsiveness to the emotions of the other and has sometimes, 
for this reason, been considered as equivalent to or synonymous 
with the ability to empathize. However, social sharing is by no 
means restricted to states of emotion and encompasses a wide 
range of different mental contents. In other words, every type of 
mental experience can become an object of social sharing.
In some cases, the sense of familiarity arising out of social 
sharing situations can lead to a sense of intimacy or of bonding; 
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Sullivan was the first to underline the connections between social 
sharing and this sense of intimacy. In his view, both the capacity 
for constructing close personal and social bonds with friends and 
romantic partners and the need for intimacy emerge between 
childhood and adolescence, when one’s closest peer relation-
ships are likely to be with same-gender friends (39). Sullivan 
described intimacy as a collaboration in which both partners 
reveal themselves and seek and express validation of each other’s 
attributes and world views. Since close friends generally resemble 
each other, collaboration on establishing shared understandings 
and a sense of mutual esteem and emotional security is relatively 
straightforward. Other researchers have shown that between 
childhood and adolescence, children’s descriptions of friendship 
begin to emphasize this aspect of sharing intimate thoughts and 
feelings (40–42).
The mental states shared by the agents during social interac-
tions can vary widely, ranging from the sharing of simple and 
immediate goals, to the common ground of shared knowledge, 
the awareness of a shared emotional experience, or the intimate 
knowledge shared with a partner or a family member. The 
hypothesis we will discuss here proposes that experiences of 
social sharing can be classified at different levels of complexity 
according to the type of mental content shared by the agents.
Social sharing can also be described in terms of the conse-
quences it produces. One important consequence concerns 
emotional effects, or the subjective perceptions produced in the 
agents involved. Dimaggio et al. (43) discuss how people perceive 
different shared mental contents such as values, beliefs, emotional 
experiences, and interests, and they suggest that such perceptions 
form the basis for people’s sense of belonging to social groups. 
In Tomasello’s anthropological interpretation (2), social sharing 
with group members is the basis for affiliation processes. Along 
the same lines, recent neuropsychological data have shown that 
our personal experience of specific interactions conducted with 
others can influence the modalities of subsequent interactions 
and even the neural systems activated during those later social 
interactions (32). According to Procacci (44), enjoyment and 
pleasure in interaction are generally associated with social shar-
ing, while withdrawal is linked to embarrassment and, in some 
clinical conditions such as avoidant personality disorder (AvPD), 
to shame, threat and severe isolation. The behavioral outcomes of 
social sharing, however, extend beyond the emotional domain. 
As research into collective intentionality has shown, the experi-
ence of social sharing facilitates cooperation and reciprocal 
commitment. People engaged in a joint action automatically take 
up a specific mental attitude (we mode), assuming that they are 
expected to play their part and that their counterparts will also 
contribute to the joint enterprise. In other words, a collective 
expectation arises that joint obligations will be shared and will be 
mutually respected by all the actors involved. Joint aims, inten-
tions, or shared ideas are what shape cooperative and normative 
behaviors, choices which are based on respect for the rules of 
reciprocal commitment.
Finally, identifying the mental abilities involved is funda-
mental for an understanding of the social sharing experience. 
Although many diverse abilities and neurobiological mechanisms 
are implicated in the different forms of social sharing, we have 
described, for the purposes of this study we consider one ability, 
mindreading, which appears to play an important role in many 
forms of social sharing.
In our hypothesis, the fundamental precondition for social 
sharing is that individuals must be capable of forming internal 
representations of their own minds and of the minds of oth-
ers, either through implicit elaboration of social information 
(through mimicry, for instance, or through the interpretation of 
facial expressions), or by processing explicit information. Vice 
versa, where mindreading capacities are impaired, we can expect 
a failure of social sharing (44, 45). As we will discuss below in 
greater detail, there is clinical relevance in identifying the role of 
mindreading in different types of social sharing experience, since 
a number of mental disorders are associated with some degree 
of impairment of interpersonal relationships and with social 
withdrawal, in particular in the case of the personality disorders. 
Patients with personality disorders are significantly affected by 
interpersonal difficulties (20, 46). In particular, lack of experi-
ence of social interaction and intimacy, as well as impairments in 
mindreading, appear to play a significant role in mental disorders 
characterized by chronic social withdrawal, such as avoidant, 
paranoid, or schizoid personality disorder (44, 47–49). We will 
argue in this study that classification of social sharing at differ-
ent levels, according to the complexity of the contents and the 
complexity of the mindreading competence required, can provide 
a framework for the design of graduated clinical interventions to 
enhance the social sharing skills of patients with AvPD.
Summing up, social sharing is typical of human interaction 
and emerges very early in life, evolving into increasingly complex 
forms throughout development (38). Social sharing refers to a 
specific interpersonal experience involving two (or more) human 
agents, each of whom is able to form internal representations of 
the mental states shared with the other agent/s. The contents 
held in mind and in common by two (or more) agents, can be 
highly diverse and can range from a shared motor plan of action 
to the communication of personal or intimate information. Social 
sharing is accompanied by positive emotions, such as mutual 
enjoyment, all of which can promote reciprocal commitment, 
cooperation, affection, and the sense of belonging. Certain 
preconditions must be met if social sharing is to take place: 
agents must be motivated to engage in social sharing and their 
mindreading skills must be fit to meet the specific demands of 
processing more or less complex mental contents involved in 
different types of social sharing.
In this study, we will first of all discuss the inter-relationships 
between social sharing and mindreading skills. We will argue that 
there is a reciprocal, bi-directional influence between the two. 
While mindreading competence is a necessary precondition for 
social sharing, it is also the case that social sharing experience 
modifies and enhances mindreading skills. Over time, a virtu-
ous circle evolves with repeated and varied experiences of social 
sharing sharpening and upgrading people’s mindreading skills. 
We will present here a model of different type of social sharing 
experiences classified according to their complexity. The simplest 
levels of social sharing involve simple contents which, therefore 
also require a minimum of ability to attribute mental states to 
others (mindreading). The more complex levels of social sharing 
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involve more complex states of mind during the interaction and 
make greater demands on mindreading competence.
In the second part of this paper, we will focus on some forms of 
psychopathology in which an inversion of the positively recipro-
cal relationship between social sharing and mindreading takes 
place, producing the vicious circle of social withdrawal and isola-
tion. Additionally, we will show how a model of different levels 
of social sharing can inform the development of more focused, 
graduated clinical interventions for PD patients with severe social 
withdrawal.
MindreadinG and FoUr LeVeLs  
oF soCiaL sHarinG
As we showed above, there are various human interactions which 
can be considered as expressions of social sharing. The aim of 
this work is both to differentiate different types of social sharing 
and to classify them according to levels of complexity. In our 
hypothesis, the two main constituent elements involved are (1) 
the type of mental content shared by the agents, and (2) the level 
of mindreading skill which each agent must possess in order 
to understand and evaluate what is being reciprocally shared. 
In the preceding section, we showed that social interaction can 
encompass the sharing of diverse mental states: intentions, atten-
tion, knowledge, emotions. In the course of one interaction, it 
is possible to share one or more of these diverse mental states. 
We hypothesize that social sharing can be classified in terms of 
complexity of mental content.
To illustrate this point, we may imagine two very different 
social interactions based on an identical scenario. The scenario 
involves two individuals at a party, who are asked to move a heavy 
table together. In the first scenario, the two agents do not know 
each other, while in the second scenario they are old friends. We 
can imagine that in the first situation the two agents restrict their 
interaction to coordinating the table-moving operation and that 
their conversation is focused primarily on the task in hand. In 
the second scenario, we can imagine a very different style of com-
munication. Two friends who have not seen each other for some 
time are asked to move a heavy table into the garden. Reminiscing 
about a removal they once worked on together, one starts joking 
with the other about his poor performance on the previous occa-
sion. He keeps up a running commentary about the poor shape 
his friend is in, possibly even worse than the time before, while 
obstructing every maneuver, trying to trick him into making false 
moves and teasing him relentlessly. The other one joins in the fun, 
retaliating in kind.
Although the joint action in both scenarios is identical (mov-
ing a table together), the mental contents involved in each case 
are only partially similar. Each pair shares the same goal and 
reciprocal commitment (moving a table) and, with this aim in 
view, each agent monitors his own movements and modulates 
his own actions in coordination with those of his partner. The 
motor planning and the joint attention required are the same in 
each scenario. The outcome of this type of sharing is in each case 
a joint action regulated by cooperation.
However, in the second scenario, the social sharing involved 
encompasses additional mental states and operates at a far higher 
degree of complexity. Both agents share a memory and a frame 
of reference deriving from their past experience together, which 
constitutes an implicit body of knowledge that both agents share 
in and can draw on during the current interaction (common 
ground). In other words, the experiences lived through together 
in the past are being reactivated in interpersonal communication 
here and now, and there is a reciprocal awareness of this fact. The 
irony and the reciprocal teasing that characterize this interaction 
are based on reciprocal knowledge of past shared experience.
A comparison between these two scenarios makes plain how 
even a very brief and simple social interaction such moving a 
table together can comprise qualitatively very different experi-
ences of social sharing and reciprocity, depending on the different 
types of mental states which constitute the interaction such as 
shared intention, shared memories, common knowledge, emo-
tional attitude. We therefore hypothesize that the type of mental 
content being shared may be considered a crucial element for the 
classification of different experiences of social sharing.
If an individual is to take part in interpersonal communica-
tion based on social sharing, and if they are to experience, this 
as an enjoyable activity, they must be capable of representing to 
themselves the mental states involved in the interaction. As we 
have described above, mental states can vary greatly from interac-
tion to interaction. We therefore consider mindreading ability as 
the second fundamental element of social sharing, and that social 
sharing interactions can also be classified according the complex-
ity of the mindreading skills required in a given interaction.
Mindreading is the mental function that allows us to observe 
and reflect upon mental states, either our own (e.g., what do I feel 
about the other person or what do I want from them), or those of 
others engaged in interactions with us (e.g., what are his intentions, 
what sort of mood is she in, what does she think about a specific 
topic). Mindreading, mentalization, or metacognition is different 
terms which all refer to a general ability to understand and reflect 
on both our own mental states and other people’s (50–53). The way 
we use the term mindreading in this study relates back to a wider 
concept of mentalization as defined by Allen et al. (54), meaning 
“to keep the mind in mind.” Thus, mindreading refers to a complex 
of implicit and explicit operations centered around understanding 
mental states, one’s own and those of others; operations which are 
deployed by individuals in their everyday interactions with vary-
ing degrees of proficiency and success (51–53, 55). Mindreading is 
a mental ability which is considered fundamental for the gradual 
development of social competencies (38) from early infancy 
onward and into adulthood (56). Consistently with this view, the 
early mindreading impairments that accompany autistic spectrum 
disorders are seen as playing a significant role in the profound 
social difficulties which are characteristic of the autism spectrum.
If mindreading capacities are key to the development of social 
competence in general, we would also expect them to be involved 
in that specific modality of social interaction which is social 
sharing. We hypothesize that social sharing and mindreading 
can be viewed as tightly related and that a better understanding 
of this relationship may also serve various clinical purposes, as 
we discuss below.
If we take a long-term perspective, over a period of years, 
the interaction between experiences of social sharing and 
5Colle et al. Social Sharing and Personality Disorders
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org December 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 263
mindreading skills appears as a factor which may support or 
impede the development of satisfying and stable interpersonal 
relationships. Motivation for social sharing stimulates individu-
als to take an interest in other people’s mental states and to pay 
attention to them. Simple forms of such interest, together with 
attention to interpersonal signals, have been observed even in 
new-born infants, who appear to prefer human faces to other 
visual stimuli and to be more attentive to human faces than to 
other visual stimuli (57). This early interest in social signals puts 
infants on track to eventually codify the various implicit and 
automatic signals involved in understanding the minds of oth-
ers (58, 59). In turn, from infancy onward, mindreading skills 
can facilitate and enhance social sharing experience. Numerous 
studies have supported the hypothesis that mindreading capacity 
is fundamental for creating, regulating and maintaining posi-
tive interpersonal relationships (60, 61). The literature on child 
development highlights the importance of the quality of early 
interpersonal relationships for the development of mindreading. 
Attachment theory, for example, proposes that early child/car-
egiver relationships affect children’s emotional functioning at all 
levels, from emotional awareness to emotion regulation strategies 
[e.g., see Ref. (62, 63)]. Similarly, some studies have found that 
the mentalizing capacity of caregivers, or the extent to which they 
are able to comprehend the child’s internal states and to reflect 
them back accurately to the child, represents a strong predictor 
of adult mindreading ability (64, 65). Halberstadt et al. (66) found 
that children who show high ability to understand emotional cues 
in their social environments generally develop superior social 
skills and form healthy interpersonal relationships. Moreover, 
a positive relationship has been found between children’s emo-
tional understanding and their pro-social behavior and also their 
acceptance and popularity with peers (67–69). Conversely, poor 
understanding of emotions and failure to represent interactions 
in terms of mental states has been associated with a wide range 
of psychiatric conditions (70). Reciprocal inter-relations between 
mindreading capacity, social sharing, and psychopathology will 
be discussed in the section below.
We use mindreading capacity not only to interpret the mental 
states of others but also to access our own mental states. This 
is an aspect which has been less studied by developmental 
psychologists, but it does seem to be the case that the ability to 
understand one’s own internal mental states also plays a role in 
fostering or in inhibiting social sharing experience. Access to our 
own mental content enables us to identify what we are feeling, 
thinking, or wishing for, and to establish connections between 
this content and the person we are engaging with. Awareness and 
recollection of a specific emotional memory may motivate us to 
seek out further opportunities for social interaction with that 
particular person, or to seek similar levels of communication 
in other interpersonal relationships (affiliative or other close 
relationships). People who are aware that sharing an objective, 
a memory or an emotion can enhance their sense of subjective 
well-being are more highly motivated to seek further opportu-
nities for similar social sharing experiences. The experience of 
social sharing also promotes affiliative and cooperative behav-
iors among members of the group, and these behaviors may in 
turn promote new social sharing experiences. This bi-directional 
interplay between mindreading skills and social sharing origi-
nates in the infant’s early experience with caregivers (65, 71), 
and continues to develop during childhood and adolescence. 
Repeated experiences of social sharing promote the development 
of more sophisticated mindreading skills, which in turn facilitate 
more meaningful experiences of social sharing. Between peers 
in adolescence, for example, sharing private or personal mental 
states can provide opportunities to compare one’s own emotion-
ally significant experiences with the experiences of others (40). 
Knowing how other people feel before an exam, for instance, 
makes it possible to differentiate between common emotional 
responses and those which are more personal and specific to 
individuals. These interpersonal communications are useful 
not only in the sense that they convey information about other 
minds but also because they enable better understanding of 
one’s own mind. The interplay of mindreading and experience 
of social sharing may create virtuous as well as vicious circles. 
In psychopathological disorders, such as in patients with per-
sonality disorders, there is a bi-directional relationship between 
impaired mindreading and lack of social sharing experience, 
each element aggravating the other.
This hypothesis of an interlocking relationship between mind-
reading and social sharing is of interest, in our view, not only 
because of these long-term effects on individuals but also because 
it allows us to understand more clearly what underlies the dis-
tinctiveness of different types of social sharing interactions. As 
we illustrated through the two table-moving narratives, the joint 
action in each case required the agents to form a mental represen-
tation of a “we” mode, but the shared mental content in each case 
was widely divergent. There was a significant difference both in 
the content shared and in the complexity of the mental processing 
(mindreading) required of the two agents. As in the first example 
with the two strangers, there is not always a need to reflect in 
depth on mental states of others. There are many spontaneous 
social interactions in which, as in the first scenario of moving a 
table, a minimum of mindreading capacity is required. However, 
when relationships are prolonged over time, as happens when 
people spend significant periods of time together pursuing simi-
lar personal objectives, the content of social sharing can gradually 
become more complex. Sharing similar experiences and emo-
tions may develop further into reciprocal knowledge, or common 
ground, and reciprocal empathy. Prolonged social interaction can 
in this way create a dynamic which allows individuals to achieve 
highly diversified and complex levels of mutual understanding. 
At its most complex level, this is the kind of understanding of 
other minds which can be experienced in close friendships or 
couple relationships.
We propose here four different levels of social sharing, based 
on the contents shared during the interactions and the complexity 
of mindreading skills required:
(1) First level: shared short-term goals. In these cases, social 
sharing is connected with a precise short-term objective 
and may involve an action, a communicative exchange, or 
joint attention focused on the same event. In such interac-
tions, the reciprocal mindreading required for successful 
accomplishment of the action is minimal. To paraphrase a 
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famous example from Fodor (72), all you need to do if you 
want to meet somebody somewhere is to imagine that the 
other person intends to meet you (shares our objective) and 
that you both intend to meet each other on a certain day, at 
a certain place and time. When people share a short-term 
objective, such as the two strangers in our first example 
who are moving a table together at a party, the mindreading 
activity involved can be described as joint attention focused 
on the same event and as a reciprocal understanding of the 
intentions underlying the actions of the other agent.
(2) Second level: common ground. Actions or experiences that 
individuals take part in together create opportunities for 
joint attention and for the constitution of a body of shared 
knowledge, a shared frame of reference, which is termed com-
mon ground. Our second illustration with the two friends 
moving a table shows how common ground can function 
as a resource, which can be drawn upon to create mental 
representations of reciprocally shared and known contents. 
In this sense, sharing knowledge can also be a mindread-
ing operation, since it requires each agent to form a mental 
representation of the other agent’s previous knowledge of or 
beliefs concerning a specific past experience. The common 
ground of the two friends could be described in the following 
terms: I know that you know X (or that you believe or remem-
ber X). You also know that I know this too and that I have 
clear memories of X. This allows us both to allude to X in ways 
which are not necessarily and immediately comprehensible or 
accessible to others. In other words, interactions like the one 
illustrated here presuppose that each agent has the resources 
to engage in a complex activity of attribution of mental states 
to the other. Mindreading in this example operates at a more 
complex level than in the first story, where joint attention is 
called for and an understanding of the other agent’s inten-
tions as they relate to the physical action of moving the table. 
In the second story, the two friends engaged in moving the 
table use the same skills, but additionally they are constantly 
referring back to a range of shared memories of past activi-
ties. During the interaction, each agent is therefore actively 
creating a rich representation of what the other knows and 
remembers of these previously shared experiences, and of 
how they relate to the current activity. Allusions to their 
common ground are key to the quality of this complex and 
enjoyable interaction.
(3) Third level: emotional social sharing. People sharing emotions 
are not only experiencing the same event or the same activ-
ity (and the reciprocal knowledge of that event or activity). 
They are also experiencing the same or similar emotional 
attitude, as friends do when they laugh at the same joke or 
shed tears at the same movie. In such situations, the contents 
being shared are emotions, or are related to emotions and to 
emotional reciprocity. Interactions at this level require the 
use of common ground, but with the additional element of 
reciprocal communication of emotion; these interactions 
may assume connotations of greater personal significance. 
This could be stated as: I know that you feel as I do about X, or 
that your feelings are similar. Over and above that, I know that 
you know that I share your feelings. People who have shared 
emotions with each other are often interested in creating 
further opportunities for interaction. This increases the 
probability that more time will be spent together, which in 
turn may create favorable conditions for emotional bonding 
and stable relationships.
(4) The fourth level: familiarity and intimacy. Close friendships 
and intimate, stable relationships are characterized by a com-
plex and highly articulated level of social sharing and bond-
ing. Typically, such bonding is associated with having spent 
substantial periods of time together and with an accretion of 
common ground and of shared emotional experience which 
allows each partner to construct a rich and coherent body 
of knowledge about the other. The salient point here is the 
development of deep reciprocal knowledge, rather than the 
nature of the relationship itself. For example, in the context 
of a sexual relationship, reciprocal sharing of personal and 
intimate contents may take place. However, such sharing is 
not a necessary component of a sexual relationship.
Close friendships and romantic relationships are associated 
with complex, meaningful reciprocal knowledge, and complex 
mindreading. Each actor can draw upon rich resources of infor-
mation about their partner. This enables them to form highly 
articulated representations of the mind of the other, such as 
nuanced descriptions of their partner’s personality or intuitive 
predictions of their probable responses to specific situations. 
Reciprocal knowledge at this level allows us to modulate and 
maintain stable, meaningful relationships with the people who 
are closest to us.
Intimacy can be experienced both in small groups of peo-
ple and in dual relationships. In a small group of friends, for 
example, it is possible that A, B, and C are all in possession of 
a certain body of shared knowledge, that they all feel the same 
way about certain past experiences they shared, and that they 
have developed deep reciprocal knowledge of each other over 
time, through changing circumstances and as they grow older 
together. A, B, and C are all reciprocally aware of this shared 
inheritance of group experience, and on this basis, they may 
develop a sense of intimacy which is specific to this particular 
group. It follows that each member of the group will respond to 
social occasions together with a sense of intimacy and sharing 
which is very different from that experienced in social situations 
with others who they know less well. However, since these are 
intimate and private relationships, it is also possible to imagine 
that each member of the group may develop a dual relationship 
with each other member, and that such relationships may have 
some particular quality which is specific to that relationship 
alone. The reciprocal social sharing and reciprocal knowledge 
between A and B, for example, may not be the same as between 
A and C, or B and C.
We suggest that looking at human social sharing in terms 
of different levels of complexity as we do in this model offers a 
number of advantages in the clinical context. As we will discuss 
in the next section, model provides us with a structured frame-
work for clinical intervention in cases of personality pathologies 
where the improvement or enhancement of social interaction is 
a priority.
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soCiaL sHarinG and personaLity 
disorders
In the first section of this paper, we propose that a relationship 
of interdependence exists between social sharing and mindread-
ing and that social sharing can be described in terms of levels 
of complexity which are determined by the complexity of the 
mindreading operations involved in a given interaction. In the 
following section, we will attempt to illustrate the relevance of this 
dynamic of interdependence for the clinical context. In our view, 
the concept of a dynamic relationship between social sharing and 
mindreading is of clinical interest for two different reasons: first, 
because linking mindreading and social sharing can extend our 
understanding of specific forms of social withdrawal in personal-
ity disorders and, second, because differentiating and describing 
social sharing in terms of levels of complexity can support the 
development of specific interventions for the treatment of social 
withdrawal in personality disorders.
Social withdrawal is arguably a trans-diagnostic core feature 
of psychopathology (73). Difficulties with social interaction and 
the absence of stable networks of social relations feature in the 
clinical descriptions of many conditions and disorders, from the 
autism spectrum disorders to personality disorders and social 
phobia (SP).
There are three main factors, differently combined, which are 
associated with social withdrawal symptoms: (1) low motivation, 
(2) anxiety specific to social settings, and (3) inability to construct 
satisfying interpersonal relationships.
Motivation, as we mentioned earlier, is a precondition for 
social sharing. This motivation is already present in early infancy, 
and it is fundamental for the promotion of social interactions, 
for the acquisition of mindreading abilities and for the practice 
of perspective-taking. However, the absence of motivation to 
engage in close interpersonal relationships is a significant factor 
in some psychopathologies; and in some neurobiological condi-
tions, such as Schizoid Personality Disorder or high functioning 
autism (20, 21, 74), this motivation to engage in close interper-
sonal relationships is typically absent. Social withdrawal is also 
present in many disorders where patients are actively motivated 
and interested in social sharing but find it hard to put into prac-
tice. Particularly patients with SP and AvPD appear to be moti-
vated toward social sharing, but their efforts and aspirations to 
construct secure, meaningful, interpersonal relationships either 
end in failure or are associated with anxieties, embarrassment, 
and constant exertion (75, 76). SP and AvPD have frequently 
been considered as two very similar disorders, each character-
ized by social anxieties and differing only in intensity, with SP as 
the mildest form (77). However, recent studies have highlighted 
some qualitative differences between AvPD and SP, which appear 
to be related specifically to the capacity for creating opportuni-
ties for intimacy and social sharing with others (78–80). Millon 
(81) suggested that patients with AvPD fear relationships with 
other people, whereas patients with SP fear social situations. In 
other words, fear of social situations is related to specific social 
contexts (parties, large groups, meetings), which are experienced 
with excessive anxiety and shame. Fear of relationships, on the 
other hand, is linked with more basic interpersonal dysfunction 
involving avoidance of intimacy and chronic feelings of shame 
and inadequacy (78, 82, 83). Dimaggio et al. (79, 80) defined this 
structural interpersonal dysfunction in APD as a pervasive sense 
of not belonging. This sense of not belonging is likely to inhibit 
the development of social interactions based on affiliation and 
cooperation.
In the context of this current debate on the differences between 
social withdrawal in SP disorders and in AvPD, it may be useful 
to consider the way social sharing and mindreading interact. 
Many patients with social anxiety disorder who present avoidant 
behaviors in certain situations are not always reluctant to engage 
in interactions, neither are they incompetent at relating to others 
under all circumstances. Their fears of being judged by others are 
restricted to specific contexts of interaction. In other contexts, 
they may be capable of constructing close personal relationships 
and of enjoying moments of social sharing. Patients with AvPD 
are similarly anxious about social situations but, unlike the SP 
patients, and regardless of the setting or the circumstances, they 
are unable to enjoy or find satisfaction in social relationships 
and unable to construct meaningful interpersonal relationships. 
Summing up, patients with AvPD can be considered as experi-
encing “severe” social withdrawal for the following reasons: they 
experience pervasive fear of all types of interpersonal relation-
ship, constant avoidance of intimacy, a chronic perception of not 
belonging and non-affiliation, and a diffuse sense of inadequacy 
which is not limited to specific social situations, as it is in the 
case of patients with SP. Millon has a concise description for the 
difference between AvPD patients and SP patients: patients with 
AvPD fear relationships rather than social situations (81).
Our hypothesis is that in the case of AvPD, anxiety, and 
impaired social sharing skills interact with and potentiate each 
other, producing a dramatic vicious circle in which patients are 
negatively affected both by isolation and by their experiences of 
interaction with others.
We have described social sharing as a positive interaction 
which presupposes both positive interpersonal relationships 
and mindreading ability. Mindreading functions as the core 
skill which enables the development of social sharing at vari-
ous levels of complexity. Social sharing enhances interpersonal 
relationships. In turn, and over time, positive interpersonal 
relationships provide opportunities to improve and enhance 
mindreading skills.
In patients with AvPD, this process appears to manifest itself 
in reverse, as a vicious circle, in which poor mindreading and 
lack of social sharing experience sustain each other in turn. This 
hypothesis can be supported by two types of empirical evidence: 
(a) data which show that patients with AvPD have difficulties with 
mindreading and (b) data which show that the developmental his-
tory of these patients reveals a lack of interpersonal relationships.
Several authors are in agreement that the interpersonal dif-
ficulties typical for Personality Disorders are tightly linked to 
patients’ poor understanding of their own mental states and those 
of others (45, 80, 84). Mindreading difficulties in PD patients 
have also been described in terms of differentiated profiles of 
impairment: individual patients may present specific profiles of 
dysfunction, with some mentalization skills more impaired than 
others (53).
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For example, the mindreading impairments observed in 
AvPD patients appear to lie mainly in the areas of emotional 
awareness and alexithymia (85, 86). Patients with AvPD not only 
lack awareness of negative emotions but also have low awareness 
of pleasurable emotions and enjoyment (82, 87, 88). Analysis 
of session transcripts of patients with PDs indicates that those 
with AvPD and Narcissistic PD showed the greatest difficulty in 
identifying emotions and their causes (79). These findings are 
corroborated by recent data which show that specific difficulty 
in identifying and reporting inner states (such as emotions, 
thoughts, or intentions) is strongly correlated with a “withdrawal” 
personality style (45). Similar findings are reported by Eikenaes 
and colleagues. Comparing AvPD with SP patients, they found 
that those with AvPD have a more vulnerable sense of self and 
are less self-reflective than patients with SP (82). AvPD patients 
scored as healthy control group in identifying different emotional 
expressions, except for fear (89). Another comparative study of 
AvPD patients, SP patients and patients with other personality 
disorders, found that the AvPD patients were less able to identify 
mental states in themselves and in others (49, 90).
Experimental findings have shown that there is an association 
between poor mindreading skills and the interpersonal relation-
ship difficulties observed in AvPD. Fear of being judged, social 
anxiety, the sense of shame and avoidance are all emotions and 
social behaviors which appear to be strongly linked to deficits in 
social sharing, reciprocal knowledge, and intimacy. In their social 
interactions, these patients rarely perceive other agents as peers, 
as basically well-meaning and supportive individuals who may 
even resemble them in some ways in their aspirations to friend-
ship, shared experiences, and meaningful relationships (91). The 
developmental history of patients with AvPD is characterized 
by low frequency of interpersonal relationships among peers, 
often limited to standard social situations such as school, and by 
difficult family relationships. In other words, there is a marked 
lack of intimate relationships and enjoyable social relationships 
in the lives of these patients. They have often experienced ostra-
cism and social isolation during childhood and adolescence 
(48, 82). Such experiences of chronic social rejection and exclusion 
increase the likelihood that social interaction will be interpreted 
as threatening and they are strongly associated with social anxi-
ety and isolation (92). In short, patients with PD characterized 
by severe social withdrawal typically present with the following 
profile: (a) poor mindreading ability regarding both self and oth-
ers; (b) a developmental history characterized by few opportuni-
ties to socialize and limited time spent with others; and (c) few 
individuals available for enjoyable and satisfying interpersonal 
communication and not infrequently nobody available at all.
The social sharing model we described here can be used by 
clinicians to define the objectives of therapy with greater clarity. 
For example, patients with AvPD frequently report dissatisfaction 
at their lack of social relationships. However, their mindreading 
deficits and their limited experience of functioning social rela-
tionships may lead them to imagine relationships built on rank 
and dominance, rather than around social sharing. Since the 
lives of these patients are typically conditioned by experiences 
of exclusion and humiliation, some may cultivate fantasies in 
which the experience of submission and victimization is reversed, 
imagining themselves in dominant and abusing roles (44). 
In such cases, the therapeutic objectives must therefore include 
learning to distinguish clearly between social interactions based 
on rank and dominance and the more functional and enjoyable 
interactions which are based on reciprocity and social sharing.
This social sharing model may also serve as a basis or frame-
work for the treatment of impaired social skills. As we discussed 
above, one important difference between patients with AvPD and 
patients with SP is related to the presence or absence of mind-
reading skills, which enable people to construct stable, satisfying 
relationships (49). This difference has a significant impact on 
treatment decisions. In the case of patients with AvPD, treatment 
will produce results only if accompanied by gradual acquisition 
of the social sharing and mindreading skills which will enable 
functioning interpersonal relationships. With such clinical 
applications in mind, the social sharing model presented here has 
the advantage of differentiating acts of social sharing in terms of 
levels of complexity. The model provides a rationale for the step 
by step, incremental learning of social sharing skills in a group 
therapy setting with a specific focus on social skills training. In 
parallel, patients attend individual therapy sessions. The group 
therapy uses an explicit psycho-educational approach to teach or 
to raise conscious awareness of the mindreading skills and the 
basics of social sharing which these patients lack. Importantly, 
the group social skills training also provides a safe space for real 
interactions, a therapeutic setting where theoretical awareness 
can be translated into practice with the guidance and monitoring 
of the therapists. In other words, the group therapy has a dual 
objective: teaching patients explicitly to reflect not only on social 
sharing and on thinking about thinking but also providing a 
practical, real-life opportunity to experience social sharing and 
mindreading directly.
This social skills training group is made up of patients with 
AvPD and associated difficulties. Two therapists work together 
to introduce the different elements and stages of social sharing. 
Patients are guided gradually toward direct experience of various 
levels of sharing through role play in the group, class discus-
sions, and exposure exercises. The program is composed of two 
modules, one with a focus on mindreading skills and the other 
focused on the different levels of social sharing. The mindread-
ing module addresses the acquisition of different mindreading 
skills. This module includes various practice exercises which aim 
to enhance patients’ awareness of their own mental processes 
and emotions and to improve their understanding of the mental 
states of others. Through group discussions, the module also aims 
to improve patients’ ability to assume perspectives other than 
their own (perspective-taking, or decentering), and to evaluate 
the mental states of others as existing independently and not 
necessarily connected to our own. The social sharing module 
is based on the framework of levels of complexity described 
above. As we discussed in the introduction, social sharing is the 
basis of both cooperative behaviors and the individual’s sense 
of belonging to the group. Both are generally severely impaired 
or absent in patients with AvPD. For this reason, social sharing 
experience is initially modeled through very simple tasks, such 
as sharing an immediate goal in the here and now, e.g., by form-
ing teams for a game. These activities provide a first opportunity 
for brief, focused communication with others on specific topics 
(Short-Term Goal). Over time and through repeated moments 
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of interaction, the members of the group begin to discover and 
to share different relational challenges, to recognize similarities 
and differences in each other and to share more explicitly a 
long-term goal: learning how to practice the essential skills 
that underpin effective social interaction (Long-Term Goal). 
These group sessions take place in a relaxed and good-humored 
atmosphere. Their purpose is not only to discuss and reflect on 
aspects of social sharing but also to enable concrete emotional 
experiences which are positive and enjoyable in themselves 
(Emotional Social Sharing). We consider that sharing enjoyable 
social experiences is a key component for the promotion of the 
sense of belonging and of cooperative behaviors. By the final stage 
of the group experience, the members know each other better 
and can begin to experiment with the personal and interpersonal 
effects of confiding in another person and sharing information of 
a more personal nature, taking turns as speaker and listener. At 
this stage, patients may begin to acquire an understanding of the 
more complex level of social sharing that encompasses friendship 
and intimacy (Familiarity and Intimacy). As they progress from 
simple to more complex social sharing experiences in the pro-
tected group setting, patients are also actively engaged in step by 
step improvement of their mindreading skills within the group. 
Until they have acquired an adequate understanding of the way 
other minds work, it may be not only difficult for such patients 
to establish close interpersonal relationships outside supportive 
settings but even risky, given their poor mindreading abilities 
and their unrealistic expectations of interpersonal relationships. 
Starting off at the simpler levels of social sharing allows patients 
to practice mindreading in a monitored, supportive setting and 
to regulate levels of social interaction according to their own 
growing capacity for mindreading. Once patients understand that 
social exchanges need not necessarily involve highly personal or 
sensitive material, they can be encouraged to engage in social and 
communicative interactions outside the group, with appropriate 
backup and reassurance. During the skills training, patients 
develop awareness of social sharing as an inherently enjoyable 
aspect of social interaction. They are also made explicitly aware 
of the fact that social sharing requires differentiated, flexible 
approaches and that there are many different ways of engaging 
in social sharing. Positive experiences in the group and enhanced 
awareness of mindreading skills may prompt patients to explore 
further options for social interaction and their own availability 
for such interactions outside the clinical setting.
We suggest that this incremental, structured approach to 
social skills training in group therapy settings may provide an 
efficacious method of treatment, allowing clinicians to address 
directly the interpersonal difficulties which characterize per-
sonality disorders. Further studies will be required to test the 
effectiveness of the proposed treatment model.
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